After World Cup exit, what comes next for USWNT?
A wholesale look at the state of U.S. women's soccer through analysis of the system, strategy, coach, and team that crashed out of the World Cup and what the future may hold.
It will not be long until the 2024 Olympics women’s soccer tournament starts on July 24 next year. If you’re the U.S. women’s national team, you have limited time to respond to the wake-up call that was a round of 16 exit—the earliest in team history—in this World Cup at the hands of Sweden. The reign of the U.S. women’s national team is over; the time for a reset is now.
The questions on U.S. fans' lips are multifold. What comes next for the USWNT? What went wrong that caused such an early elimination? What changes must be implemented to regain the previous dominance? With the rest of the world investing more resources in women’s soccer, is American supremacy possible anymore? U.S. Soccer needs to act fast on what they can control and get the ball rolling to strive for an even better future for the national team.
Firstly, this early exit, as painful as it is for the players and fans, was a necessary wake-up call to get the USWNT program back on track and make a point that the team cannot rely on the previously successful grit, athleticism, and fitness to outlast the opposition. The U.S. was inferior technically and tactically to the Netherlands and Portugal, leading to two ties. Against Vietnam, the Vietnamese were well organized and did not crumble in the last 30 minutes, not allowing the U.S. to pour on the scoring, similar to the 13-0 score we saw against Thailand in 2019. The win and two ties advanced the U.S. barely, but warning signs were evident from the early stages, or even before the World Cup even started.
The trouble began with a lengthy injury list featuring four probable starters: Mal Pugh (the team’s leading goalscorer), Sam Mewis (the USWNT 2021 Player of the Year), Catarina Macario (the brightest young attacker), and Becky Sauerbrunn (the captain and defensive linchpin). The U.S. is not the only team to face injuries, but the number of vital, in-form players who could not be a part of the team made the U.S.’s 2023 campaign feel more about who wasn’t there than who was.
Once the games began in New Zealand and Australia, another issue quickly arose: the lack of finishing. The most telling statistic is that the expected goals for the USWNT in their four games were nine; however, the team only scored four times—three of which came against lowly Vietnam. In the Vietnam game, the U.S. bossed possession, but when it came time to put the ball in the back of the net, the attacking players struggled, taking shots off target or tamely hitting at the goalkeeper on countless occasions. Once the competition increased in the second game against the Netherlands, changes had to be made to address these issues.
The match against the European powerhouses and a rematch of the 2019 final was circled as soon as the World Cup draw came out—but it was the Netherlands who seemed more up for the game. The Dutch controlled the midfield and were the more dangerous team for the first hour of the game, displaying their tactical acumen to leave the U.S. chasing shadows. Once the Americans did find an equalizer, partly due to a poke-the-bear moment from Lindsey Horan, the USWNT seemed content with a draw, abandoning the killer instinct to win games that had previously made the U.S. so feared. U.S. coach Vlatko Andonovski brought on one sub against the Netherlands, and a trend of not using, or seemingly not trusting, his bench began to develop for the USWNT. He seemed afraid to let the talent drop by subbing off an individual rather than believing in his tactics and game model to carry the team.
Against Portugal, Andonovski once again got his game plan wrong. The Portuguese controlled the middle of the park, and the Americans only survived the group stage after a late effort by Portugal’s Ana Capeta hit the post. The USWNT advanced with a second-place result, which was sufficient, but they would have to overcome a more formidable opponent in Sweden to advance to the round of 16. All of this might have been prevented if the US had been more clinical against Vietnam and had gone all out to beat the Netherlands in order to win the group.
Finally, Andonovski got the tactical game plan right vs. Sweden, bolstering the midfield with a double pivot to serve as a defensive reinforcement and a link between the defense and attack. But still, the U.S. finishing alluded to them, as they could not beat Sweden’s Zećira Mušović during the 120 minutes of play. And on penalties, the great equalizer in soccer, the Swedes, after being the inferior team for the game and weathering the U.S.’s storm, advanced. The USWNT heads home, and the American autopsy begins.
The first, and most obvious, change is moving on from Andonovski. His contract is up, and no extension will likely happen. He prided himself on being a pragmatic, defensive-minded coach—and the Americans only conceded one goal at the World Cup—but he struggled to get the best out of the attacking weapons the team had. He deployed Sophia Smith, Trinity Rodman, and Lynn Williams as wingers, even though all of them are more comfortable as No. 9s.
The attacking strategy was one-dimensional: get the ball out to one of the wingers and let them run at the defense. It proved ineffective once defenders surrounded the dribbler and no passing lanes appeared. Megan Rapinoe did not offer much off the bench; it was apparent that, at 38 years old, her brain wanted to do one thing and her body was not always able to perform it. Alex Morgan also had a dull tournament, not scoring a single goal and getting her tamely hit penalty saved vs. Vietnam. Morgan, the primary scoring threat, lost a step in her runs in behind, and her finishes were not clean enough, a trend for the entire U.S. team. When the U.S. needed a change, there was no backup No. 9 and little winger depth, an indictment on the roster construction by the coaches.
Overall, the stats tell the story of the underperforming U.S. attack. Over the course of four games, the USWNT posted 85 shots, including 28 on target, and 36 corner kicks across, but were shut out in the last two. The previous time they went scoreless in consecutive matches was in March 2017.
In midfield, Andi Sullivan was not up to the task at No. 6 and only flourished once Emily Sonnett was added as a double pivot. Lindsey Horan was a bright point, but she struggled to get on the attack until the formational tweak against Sweden. Rose Lavelle was not fully fit and only got half an hour against Portugal and the Netherlands. Her pair of yellow cards ruled her out of the knockout match against Sweden. It is a shame that Lavelle was not at her full capacity because her dribbling adroitness adds another dimension to the team.
As the Andonovski era comes to an end, you find yourself wondering why he was brought on in the first place and why he stayed for such a long time. You cannot rewrite history, but the credentials of Andonovski did not jump off the page: two NWSL Championships—albeit in the hours of the nativity of the league, before it became a staple of strong play and well-touted coaches—and coaching indoor soccer—at the same time as he was coaching the NWSL team in Kansas City, I might add.
The Olympics were the first big test after he was hired, and his USWNT did not fare well. LFG changed to WTF as Sweden pummeled the U.S. 3-0 in the opener, and more bad displays would follow with a tepid 0-0 tie vs. Australia, barely edging the Netherlands on penalties, and a punchless 1-0 semi-final elimination to Canada. Many, including myself, believed that Andonovski ought to have quit there and given a new coach two years to prepare for the World Cup. But U.S. Soccer kept him around, and the problems persisted against big opponents.
The impetus for his struggles was a failure to put out a cohesive game plan and adapt to the game as it went on. All the players say Andonovski puts in detailed preparation for a match, but few have backed his in-game adjustments. Andonovski failed to recognize the floundering U.S. midfield at the Olympics and World Cup until it was too late. His identity for the USWNT after four years in charge was never clear.
When reflecting on his tenure, he referred to the players he coached as his "friends," which is the wrong dynamic between a coach and his players. Following the World Cup, Carli Lloyd claimed that he was readily persuaded by more seasoned players to lighten the load during training camps, which negatively impacted the team's time together and the younger players' development and fitness. After his first January camp, which was rigorous two-a-day training as a way to get the players back to fitness in the off-season, he never had a stringent training regimen again because of the complaints of soreness and cramps from the veteran players during the camp.
He is a good guy, but he was never up to the USWNT post. The results speak for themselves: he won just three of 10 games in major competitions—two during the 2021 Olympics and one in the 2023 World Cup. In those 10 games, the U.S. failed to score a goal in half of them.
The next coach is not apparent, but candidates like Emma Hayes, Sarina Wiegman, and Laura Harvey jump out. U.S. Soccer has the money to buy out any one of these options or coax a proven men’s coach I may not be thinking of to take the job. The USWNT job is still alluring, especially at this inflection point. You could jumpstart the revitalization of the team in a well-supported nation with plenty of resources and soccer-playing youth on their way.
Which brings us to the question: what is the identity of the American game anyway, and can it work in this day and age? The attitude after the U.S. won their second consecutive World Cup crown in 2019 was that the world is improving, but the USWNT is advancing at a faster rate. In 2023? The European infrastructure that is ingrained and successful for men’s soccer is now being implemented for their female counterparts. Premier League, La Liga, Ligue 1, and Bundesliga outfits have added a women’s team and academies to jump-start the development of their female players, just like the male teams. With this, players develop chemistry, technical skills, and fitness in a soccer-focused, free-of-charge, proven boarding school environment. The hotbeds are also well established; if you want to succeed in soccer, from an early age, your family moves to a city or town with an established academy (i.e., London, Barcelona, or Manchester). A family’s move for the sake of their son's or daughter’s soccer is extremely uncommon in the States.
Comparing that to the American development system, the Europeans have the edge. The ball is in the U.S.’s court to respond. Title IX, which gave the U.S. a head start against international opposition, is coming back to bite the American soccer system. The success of college soccer as the preferred path to the pros is lagging behind the rest of the world: the season is only 3–4 months a year, you are a student as well as an athlete, so your focus is not solely on your sport, and if you truly are a talent, the competition does not measure up. Players like Alyssa Thompson and Jaedyn Shaw have skipped college and gone straight to the pros to get the competition and bolster their games. But this path is the exception, not the rule.
The rule, so to speak, is the revenue-driven soccer teams that dominate every town in the nation. As Henry Bushnell of Yahoo Sports writes, "In an unchecked industry, their primary purpose was not to craft creative midfielders; it was to serve customers (parents) and make money. The industry has crumbled in recent years, with the failure of the Women’s Developmental Academy—an attempt to harmonize the youth development of girls with U.S. Soccer-coordinated coaching, competitions, and practice schedules—in 2020, three years after its inception, due to profit-driven clubs more interested in results beating out the prioritized player development of the DA.”
Bushnell adds that the shift to the rigor of the DA was essential for development but not always embraced by female players and families, even if the DA was more cost-effective. "That end game, a potentially lucrative career, justified hefty commitments and personal sacrifice for many boys, but for girls, with pro-infrastructure nascent and meager, the calculus was different. For most, soccer was necessarily a means to an end, not life’s final destination. And the DA leap—from two practices per week to four, from school friends to exclusively ambitious club teammates—was steep. A decade earlier, the boys DA’s early leaders had phased in rules on training frequency and high school participation, but for the girls in 2017, there was little leeway.” After the DA fizzled in 2020, the boys smoothly transitioned to MLS Next, an academy-like, club-backed system. The girls' teams were left out in the cold, with Elite Clubs National League (ECNL) and Girls Academy League (GA) left.
Bushnell furthers his investigation, writing: "U.S. Soccer paid the Belgian consultancy Double Pass to essentially audit DA clubs; it employed regional DA managers to support best practices and policy noncompliance. And that is what the ECNL, GA, and others lack. They all profess to have standards that facilitate player development—[ECNL girls commissioner Ralph] Richards said in his statement that ‘all full-time players in the ECNL are expected to train a minimum of three times per week, but 'enforcing them is an entirely different issue and is an extremely heavy, if not impossible, lift," [longtime college coach and inaugural GA commissioner Lesle] Gallimore admitted in a May interview before leaving her post as GA commissioner.
Unbound by mandates, some clubs have regressed to their more primitive business plans. Many prioritize winning games, which sometimes elicit ugly soccer and don’t promote long-term technical development. But it helps promote the club, which helps recruit talented players who help win games. And the self-propelling cycle spins."
The solution therein lies in NWSL teams establishing NWSL academies and expanding the league to touch on different geographical hotbeds. The academies can function much like the DA did but have a direct feed to the professional teams themselves, better coaching, and a competitive environment. Teams can gain reputations for homegrown player development, like Barcelona in Spain. This is the European model and how players build chemistry by focusing solely on soccer.
The American system has produced players who lack technical ability on the ball or tactical knowledge of how to unlock the opponent. Because U.S. players do not face much competition while they hone their game, these two things can fall by the wayside, while athleticism is enough to succeed. Players are used to dribbling their way through opposition growing up; that gets ingrained in them as they age. However, once they reach a level where they are not able to zip around opponents like the Roadrunner, they have nothing to fall back on.
For places where soccer isn't played in the winter, futsal is a viable solution. Personally, growing up in Portland, Oregon, futsal was incredibly popular during the winter months, when it was cold and rainy outside. There were established facilities—shoutout to Rose City Futsal—that had teams and leagues people aged 5 and up could play in. If you were good enough, you could train and play for competitive futsal teams, practicing and competing weekly in the winter. Through futsal, players gain more comfort on the ball and an understanding of space and movement when they do not have the rock; hard running and fitness are no match for camaraderie and technique. In Michigan, where I’ve lived for the past four years, futsal is nearly nonexistent. For the most part of the winter, teams play 11-on-11 in dome stadiums despite the fact that it snows and gets cold outside. As a result, the question of technical competence is never raised. Futsal-like environments or small-sided games are the crux of how so many global powers—from Brazil to Barcelona—learn to play the game the right way, but in the U.S., they only exist in small pockets. If cities or U.S. Soccer invest in facilities all over the nation, soccer players will come.
American players going abroad, which was unthinkable four years ago, can also be a beneficial option if an individual is willing to get out of their comfort zone to improve technically. Even if the NWSL is the most competitive league, the titans of Europe, like, say, Lyon, Chelsea, and Barcelona, offer a day-to-day training environment that would challenge every player to be on top of their game. Even if the league games can be a cakewalk, as a player, you are spending more time training with your stacked team, forcing you to heighten your game to even make the starting XI. It may not be easy for American fans to hear, but these European heavyweights are better than any NWSL team from a player's perspective. The European leagues also offer stronger technical tests, where ball skills, an American area of weakness, are heavily prioritized.
Within U.S. Soccer, Matt Crocker takes over for Earnie Stewart as the sporting director and has more experience managing women’s soccer than his predecessor. Crocker played a role in the growth of women’s youth soccer in England and now can put his stamp on the U.S. soccer system. And he has some work to do. It's possible that USWNT general manager Kate Markgraf will be let go. If so, the emphasis will shift from trying to please the current stars to looking ahead and concentrating on the younger players.
This will include addressing the U-20 national team, which has not won the World Cup since 2012, and the U-17 team, which has never won one. After all, these are the players who will feed into the national team in the future. Scouting young players to put on the youth national teams should be paramount. I know the U.S. is a big country, but it has loads of potential players who will be the future of the national team and who might otherwise stop playing or not get the right development. Crocker will have to get his hands dirty trying to right the ship of youth soccer in the United States. It is not easy, and if done wrong or not properly addressed, it can send the USWNT down the wrong path for decades to come. But if done right, you could repair the fractured pipeline for good.
What’s more, the rest of the world knows the U.S. is far from dead and will come back stronger from this wake-up call of elimination at the World Cup.
"I’ve heard there’s been a lot of talk about it, but they will come back for sure," Sweden’s Kosovare Asllani said. "They have so much quality in their team, and this defeat will not take them down. I expect them to be ready for the next World Cup. I wouldn’t say that they’re out of the game at all. So don’t talk [expletive] about U.S. women."
"The future is still bright for the U.S. Magdalena Eriksson of Sweden added, "They’re still a massive powerhouse in women’s football, and they will be for a long time."
To provide a glimmer of optimism, U.S. development is not entirely broken. Players like Naomi Girma, Sophia Smith, Alyssa Thompson, Ashley Sanchez, Trinity Rodman, and Savannah DeMelo were all solid on the biggest stage and will use that experience in the future. With the proper coaching, these players, who have the athleticism, can add the technical skills that their global counterparts have surpassed them with. More potent players are here or on their way—Shaw, Macario, Swanson, Tierna Davidson, Mia Fishel, and Sam Coffey are all 25 or younger.
A year from now, at the Paris Olympics, if the USWNT plays its cards right, it could be a starting point on the road to steering U.S. women’s soccer in the right direction for years to come.